Introduction
Public key cryptography is based on asymmetric cryptographic algorithms that use two related keys, a public key and a private key; the two keys have the property that, given the public key, it is computationally infeasible to derive the private key. A user publishes his/her public key in a public directory such as an LDAP directory and keeps his/her private key to himself/herself.
According to the purpose of the algorithm, there are public-key encryption/decryption algorithms and signature algorithms. An encryption algorithm could be used to encrypt a data (for example, a symmetric key) using the public key so that only the recipient who has the corresponding private key could decrypt the data. Typical public key encryption algorithms are RSA and ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme, see, SECG 2000) . A signature algorithm together with a message digest algorithm could be used to transform a message of any length using the private key to a signature in such a way that, without the knowledge of the private key, it is computationally infeasible to find two messages with the same signature, to find a message for a pre-determined signature, or to find a signature for a given message. Anyone who has the corresponding public key could verify the validity of the signature. Typical public key digital signature algorithms are RSA, DSA, and ECDSA.
There have been extensive standardization efforts for public key cryptographic techniques. The major standards organizations that have been involved in public key cryptographic techniques are:
• ISO/IEC. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (individually and jointly) have been developing a series of standards for application-independent cryptographic techniques. ISO has also been developing bank security standards under the ISO technical committee TC86-Banking and Related Financial Services.
• ANSI. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) have been developing public key cryptographic technique standards for financial services under Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X9. For example, they have developed the standards ANSI X9.42 (key management using Diffie-Hellman), ANSI X9.44 (key establishment 1 using factoring-based public key cryptography), and ANSI X9.63 (key agreement and key management using ECC).
• NIST. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been developing public key cryptography standards for use by US federal government departments. These standards are released in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publications.
• IETF. The Internet Engineering Task Force has been developing public key cryptography standards for use by the Internet community. These standards are published in Requests for Comments (RFCs).
• IEEE. The IEEE 1363 working group has been publishing standards for public key cryptography, including IEEE 1363-2000, IEEE 1363a, IEEE P1363.1, and IEEE P1363.2.
• Vendor-specific standards. This category includes PKCS standards that we will describe, SEC standards, and others. Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) #1 and #2 are elliptic curve public key cryptography standards that have been developed by Certicom Corp. in cooperation with secure systems developers world-wide.
The PKCS standards, developed by RSA Laboratories (a Division of RSA Data Security Inc.) in cooperation with secure systems developers worldwide for the purpose of accelerating the deployment of public-key cryptography, are widely implemented in practice, and periodically updated. Contributions from the PKCS standards have become part of many formal and de facto standards, including ANSI X9 documents, IETF documents, and SSL/TLS (Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security). The parts and status of PKCS standards are listed in Table 1 and are discussed in details in the following sections. The descriptions are largely adapted from the PKCS documents themselves. In Section 13, we give an example application which uses all these PKCS standards. 
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard
PKCS #1 v2.1 provides standards for implementing RSA algorithm-based public key cryptographic encryption schemes and digital signature schemes with appendix. It also defines corresponding ASN.1 syntax for representing keys and for identifying the schemes.
RSA is a public-key algorithm invented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (1978) which is based on the exponentiation modulo the product of two large prime numbers. The security of RSA algorithm is believed to be based on the hardness of factoring the product of large prime numbers. In PKCS #1 v2.1, multiprime RSA scheme is introduced. Multiprime RSA means that the modulus isn't the product of two primes but of more than two primes. This is used to increase performance of RSA cryptographic primitives. In particular, in multiprocessor environments, one can exponentiate modulo each prime and then apply the Chinese remainder theorem to get the final results. However, one 2 should be aware that the security strength of multiprime RSA is a little different from the original RSA scheme. If we assume that the best way to attack multiprime RSA is to factorize the modulus and the best factorization algorithm is the Number Field Sieve (NFS) algorithm, then we can compute the approximate strength of some multiprime RSA schemes as listed in Table 2 , where u is the number of primes. Similar tables for two primes RSA could be found in literatures, e.g., Lenstra and Verheul (2001) . 
RSA keys
Let n = r 1 · · · r u be the product of u ≥ 2 distinct prime numbers of approximately the same size (|n|/u bits each), where |n| denotes the number of bits in n. For the case of u = 2, one normally uses p and q to denote the two prime numbers, that is, n = pq. A typical size for n is 1024 bits, and u = 2. Let e, d be two integers satisfying e · d ≡ 1 (mod χ(n)), where χ(n) is the least common multiple of r 1 − 1, r 2 − 1, . . . , r u − 1. We call n the RSA modulus, e the encryption exponent, and d the decryption exponent. The pair (n, e) is the public key and the pair (n, d) is called the secret key or private key. The public key is public and one can use it to encrypt messages or to verify digital signatures. The private key is known only to the owner of the private key and can be used to decrypt ciphertexts or to digitally sign messages. In order to efficiently decrypt ciphertexts and to efficiently generate digital signatures, the private key may include further information such as the first two prime factors and CRT exponents and CRT coefficients of each prime factor. For a prime factor r i , its CRT exponent is a number d i satisfying e · d i ≡ 1 (mod (r i − 1)), and its CRT coefficient t i is a positive integer less than r i satisfying R i · t i ≡ 1 (mod r i ), where R i = r 1 · r 2 · . . . · r i−1 . PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies the format for such kind of enhanced private keys.
RSA encryption schemes
We begin by describing a basic version of RSA encryption scheme. A message is an integer m < n. To encrypt m, one computes c ≡ m e mod n. To decrypt the ciphertext c, the legitimate receiver computes c d mod n. Indeed,
where the last equality follows by Euler's theorem. For performance reasons, RSA is generally not used to encrypt long data messages directly. Typically, RSA is used to encrypt a secret key and the data is encrypted with the secret key using a secret key cryptography scheme such as DES or AES. Thus the actual data to be encrypted by RSA scheme is generally much smaller than the modulus and the message (secret key) needs to be padded to the same length of the modulus before encryption. For example, if AES-128 is used, then an AES key is 128 bits. Another reason for a standardized padding prior to encryption using some randomness is that the basic version of RSA encryption scheme is not secure and is vulnerable to many attacks. PKCS #1 v2.1 provides two message padding methods: EME-PKCS1-v1 5 and EME-OAEP.
RSAES-PKCS1-v1 5 padding
After EME-PKCS1-v1 5 padding to M , the padded message EM looks as follows: EM = 0x00 0x02 random octets 0x00 M where "random octets" consists of pseudo-randomly generated nonzero octets and 0x00 octet is used to delimit the padding from the actual data. The length of "random octets" is at least eight octets. The top octet 0x00 guarantees that the padded message is smaller than the modulus n (PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies that the high-order octet of the modulus must be non-zero). If the padded message EM were larger than n, decryption would produce EM mod n instead of EM . The next octet 0x02 is the format type. The value 0x02 is used to encryption and the value 0x01 is used for signature padding format RSASSA-PKCS1-v1 5 (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1 5 is no long recommended by RSA Lab.). The resulting padded message EM is |n| bits and is directly encrypted using the basic version of RSA. Bleichenbacher (1998) pointed out that improper implementation of the above padding method can lead to disastrous consequences. When the encrypted message arrives at the receiver's computer, an application decrypts it, checks the initial block, and strips off the random pad. However, some applications check for the two initial blocks 0x00 02 and if it is incorrect, they send the error message saying "invalid ciphertext". These error messages can help the attacker to decrypt ciphertext of his choice. PKCS #1 v2.1 recommends certain easily implemented countermeasures to thwart this attack. Typical examples include the addition of structure to the data to be encoded, rigorous checking of PKCS #1 v1.5 conformance in decrypted messages, and the consolidation of error messages in a client-server protocol based on PKCS #1 v1.5.
RSAES-OAEP padding
EME-OAEP is based on Bellare and Rogaway's (1995) Optimal Asymmetric Encryption scheme. Assuming that it is difficult to inverse the RSA function and the mask generation function in the OAEP padding has appropriate properties, RSAES-OAEP is proven to be secure in a stronger sense. The reader is referred to Bellare and Rogaway (1995) for details.
Let k be the length in octets of the recipient's RSA modulus, k 0 < k be an integer, H be a hash function whose outputs are k 0 -octets, and MGF be the mask generation function. For an input octet string x and an integer i, MGF(x, i) outputs a string of i octets. Let M be the k 1 -octets message such that k 1 < k − 2k 0 − 2, and L be an optional label (could be an empty string) to be associated with the message. EME-OAEP first converts the message M to a (k − k 0 − 1)-octets data block DB that looks as follows:
where "random octets" consists of pseudo-randomly generated octets. The length of "random octets" could be zero. EME-OAEP then chooses a random k 0 -octets string r, and generates the OAEP padded message EM as follows:
The resulting padded message EM is k-octets and is directly encrypted using the basic version of RSA. For decryption operations, EME-OAEP decoding method could be constructed directly.
RSA signature schemes with appendix
We begin by describing a basic version of RSA signature scheme with appendix. A message is an integer m < n. To sign m, the owner of the private key (n, d) computes the signature s ≡ m d mod n. To verify that s is a signature on m from the legitimate owner of the private key (n, d), one uses the corresponding public key (n, e) to compute m ′ ≡ s e (mod n). If m ′ = m, then the signature is valid, otherwise, the signature is invalid. The basic version of RSA signature scheme can only generate signatures on messages less than |n| bits. In addition, the basic version of RSA signature scheme is not secure. To address these issues, in practice, one first computes a message digest from a given message using a hash function such as MD5 or SHA-1. The message digest is encoded using an encoding method and the resulting string is converted to an integer and is supplied to the basic RSA signature primitive.
PKCS #1 v2.1 provides two encoding methods for encoding message digests: EMSA-PKCS1-v1 5 encoding and EMSA-PSS encoding. Correspondingly there are two signature schemes with appendix: RSASSA-PSS and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1 5. Although no attacks are known against RSASSA-PKCS1-v1 5, in the interest of increased robustness, RSASSA-PSS is recommended for eventual adoption in new applications. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1 5 is included in PKCS #1 v2.1 for compatibility with existing applications and we will not discuss it here. EMSA-PSS is based on the work of Bellare and Rogaway's (1996) . Assuming that computing eth roots modulo n is infeasible and the hash and mask generation functions in EMSA-PSS have appropriate properties, RSASSA-PSS provides secure signatures. This assurance is provable in the sense that the difficulty of forging signatures can be directly related to the difficulty of inverting the RSA function, provided that the hash and mask generation functions are viewed as black boxes or random oracles. The reader is referred to Bellare and Rogaway's (1996) for more details.
Let k be the length in octets of the RSA modulus, H be a hash function whose outputs are k 0 octets (k 0 < k), and MGF be the mask generation function. For an input octet string x and an integer i, MGF(x, i) outputs a string of i octets. Let M be the message to be signed. EMSA-PSS first constructs octet strings M ′ and DB as follows:
M ′ = 0x00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 H(M ) salt , DB = PS 0x01 salt where "salt" and "PS" consist of pseudo-randomly generated octets. The lengths of "salt" and "PS" could be zero, and the length of DB is k − k 0 − 1 octets. EMSA-PSS then constructs the octet string EM ′ as follows:
Assume that the RSA modulus has |n| bits, then the encoded string EM is obtained by setting the leftmost 8k − |n|+ 1 bits of the leftmost octet in EM ′ to zero. The resulting encoded string EM is k octets and is directly signed using the basic version of RSA signature scheme. The EMSA-PSS decoding process could to be constructed directly.
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Standard (Outdated)
PKCS #3 v1.4 describes a method for implementing Diffie-Hellman key agreement, whereby two parties can agree upon a secret key that is known only to them. PKCS #3 is superseded by modern treatment of key establishment schemes specified in IEEE 1363a (2003), ANSI 9.42, ANSI X9.44, and ANSI X9.63 etc. Basically there are two types of key establishment schemes:
1. Key agreement scheme: a key establishment scheme in which the keying data established is a function of contributions provided by both entities in such a way that neither party can predetermine the value of the keying data. Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme is an example of this category.
2. Key transport scheme: a key establishment scheme in which the keying data established is determined entirely by one entity. For example, one party chooses a random session key, encrypts it with the other party's public key, and sends the encrypted session key to the other party. The other party can then decrypt the session key. A special case of key transport scheme is the key wrap scheme in which the session key is encrypted with a pre-shared secret using a secret key cipher such as DES or AES.
PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Standard
In many applications of public-key cryptography, user security is ultimately dependent on one or more secret text values or passwords. For example, user's private key is usually encrypted with a password and the encrypted private key is kept in storage devices (see Section 7). However, there are two essential problems regarding to password application: (1) A password is not directly applicable as a key to any conventional cryptosystem; (2) Passwords are often chosen from a relatively small space. Thus special care is required to defend against search attacks. PKCS #5 provides a general mechanism to achieve an enhanced security for password-based cryptographic primitives, covering key derivation functions, encryption schemes, message-authentication schemes, and ASN.1 syntax identifying the techniques. It should be noted that other password based cryptographic techniques are currently under standardization process in IEEE 1363.2.
Key derivation functions
A password-based key derivation function produces a key from a password, a random salt value, and an iteration count. The salt is not secret and serves the purpose of producing a large set of keys for one given password, among which one is selected at random according to the salt. An iteration count serves the purpose of increasing the cost of producing keys from a password, thereby also increasing the difficulty of attack. PKCS #5 v2.0 specifies two password-based key derivation functions PBKDF1 and PBKDF2. PBKDF1 is included in PKCS #5 v2.0 only for compatibility with existing applications following PKCS #5 v1.5, and is not recommended for new applications. PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function to derive keys. The length of the derived key is essentially unbounded. However, the maximum length for the derived key may be limited by the structure of the underlying pseudorandom function. Let H be a pseudorandom function whose outputs are hLen octets, dkLen ≤ (2 32 − 1) × hLen be the intended length in octets for the derived key, P be the password (an octet string), S be an eight-octet salt string, and c be an iterating count. For each integer i, by repeatedly hashing the password, salts, etc., one gets a sequence of hLen-octets strings:
where INT(i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most significant octet first. Then one computes the hLen-octet
The derived key is the first dkLen-octet of the string T 1 ||T 2 ||T 3 || · · ·. In another word, let l = ⌈dkLen/hLen⌉ be the number of hLen-octet blocks in the derived key, rounding up, and r = dkLen − (l − 1) × hLen be the number of octets in the last block. Then the dkLen-octet derived key DK = PBKDF2(P, S, c, dkLen) looks as follows:
Encryption schemes
PKCS #5 v2.0 specifies two encryption schemes PBES1 and PBES2. PBES1 is included in PKCS #5 v2.0 only for compatibility with PKCS #5 v1.5, and is not recommended for new applications. PBES2 combines the password-based key derivation function PBKDF2 with an underlying encryption scheme E. Let M be the message to be encrypted, P be the password, k be the key length in octets for E. For the PBES2 encryption, one first selects a salt S and an iteration count c, then one computes the derived k octets key DK = PBKDF2(P, S, c, k). The ciphertext C for M is: C = E DK (M ). The decryption operation for PBES2 can be done similarly.
Message authentication schemes
In a password-based message authentication scheme, the MAC generation operation produces a message authentication code from a message under a password, and the MAC verification operation verifies the message authentication code under the same password. PKCS #5 v2.0 defines the password-based message authentication scheme PBMAC1 which combines the password-based key derivation function PBKDF2 with an underlying message authentication scheme A.
Let M be the message to be authenticated, P be the password, k be the key length in octets for A. For PB-MAC1, one first selects a salt S and an iteration count c, then one computes the derived k octets key DK = PBKDF2(P, S, c, k). The message authentication code T can be computed as T = A(M, DK). The MAC verification operation for PBMAC1 can be done similarly.
PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard (Historic)
When PKCS #6 was drafted, X.509 was in version 1.0 and no extensions component was defined in the certificate. An X.509 v3 certificate can contain information about a given entity in the extensions component. Since the introduction of X.509 v3, the status of PKCS #6 is historic.
PKCS #7 and RFC 3369: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
PKCS #7 has been superseded by IETF RFC 3369 (Housley 2002) : cryptographic message syntax (CMS), which is the basis for the S/MIME specification. CMS defines the syntax that is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. In particular, CMS describes an encapsulation syntax for data protection. The syntax allows multiple encapsulations; one encapsulation envelope can be nested inside another. Likewise, one party can digitally sign some previously encapsulated data. In the CMS syntax, arbitrary attributes, such as signing time, can be signed along with the message content, and other attributes, such as countersignatures, can be associated with a signature. A variety of architectures for certificate-based key management (e.g., the one defined by the IETF PKIX working group) are supported in CMS.
The CMS values are generated using ASN.1 with BER-encoding and are typically represented as octet strings. When transmitting CMS values in systems (e.g., email systems) that do not support reliable octet strings transmission, one should use additional encoding mechanisms that are not addressed in CMS.
CMS defines one protection content type, ContentInfo, as the object syntax for documents exchanged between entities. ContentInfo encapsulates a single identified content type and the identified type may provide further encapsulation. A ContentInfo object contains two fields: contentType (object identifier) and content. CMS defines six contentTypes: data, signed-data, enveloped-data, digested-data, encrypted-data, and authenticated-data. Additional content types can be defined outside the CMS document. The type of content can be determined uniquely by contentType. Figure 1 lists In Figure 1 , digestAlgorithms is collection of message digest algorithm identifiers. encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type identifier and the content itself. signedAttrs, unsignedAttrs, unprotectedAttrs, authAttrs, and unauthAttrs are sets of Attribute objects. An Attribute object is a sequence of two fields: attrType (object identifier) and attrValues (set of values).
PKCS #8: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard
The security of the public key cryptosystem is entirely dependent on the protection of the private keys. Generally, the private keys are encrypted with password and stored in some storage medium. It is important to have a standard to store private keys so that one can move private keys from one system to another system without any trouble. PKCS #8 v1.2 describes a syntax for private-key information, which includes a private key for some public-key algorithm and a set of attributes, and a syntax for encrypted private-key information. A password-based encryption algorithm (e.g., one of those described in PKCS #5) could be used to encrypt the private-key information.
Two objects PrivateKeyInfo and EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo are defined in this standard. A PrivateKeyInfo object contains the fields: version, privateKeyAlgorithm, privateKey, and attributes (optional), where privateKeyAlgorithm is the identifier of the private key algorithm, privateKey is the octet string representing the private key, and attributes is a collection of attributes that are encrypted along with the private key. An EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo object contains two fields: encryptionAlgorithm and encryptedData, where encryptionAlgorithm identifies the algorithm under which the private-key information is encrypted, and encryptedData is the octet string representing the result of encrypting the private-key information.
In practice, the PrivateKeyInfo object is BER encoded into an octet string, which is encrypted with the secret key to give the encryptedData field of the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo object.
PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types
In order to support PKCS-defined attributes (e.g., to store PKCS attributes in a directory service) in directory systems based on LDAP and the X.500 family of protocols, PKCS #9 v2.0 defines two auxiliary object classes, pkcsEntity and naturalPerson. PKCS attributes could be packaged into these two object classes and be exported to other environments such as LDAP directory systems. PKCS #9 v2.0 also defines some new attribute types and matching rules that could be used in other PKCS standards. For example, it defines challengePassword and extensionRequest attribute types to be used in PKCS #10 attribute field, and it defines some attribute types to be used in PKCS #7 (CMS) signedAttrs, unsignedAttrs, unprotectedAttrs, authAttrs, and unauthAttrs fields (see Section 6). All ASN.1 object classes, attributes, matching rules and types defined in PKCS #9 v2.0 are exported for use in other environments.
The pkcsEntity object class is a general-purpose auxiliary object class that is intended to hold attributes about PKCS-related entities. A pkcsEntity object class contains fields: pkcsEntity = KIND (auxiliary type) PKCSEntityAttributeSet (optional) ID The PKCSEntityAttributeSet may contain any of the following attributes: pKCS7PDU (with syntax ContentInfo), userPKCS12 (with syntax PFX), pKCS15Token (PKCS #15), encryptedPrivateKeyInfo (PKCS #8), and future extensions. These attributes should be used when the corresponding PKCS data (e.g., CMS signed, or enveloped data; PKCS #12 personal identity information data; PKCS #8 encrypted private key data, etc.) are stored in a directory service.
The naturalPerson object class is a general-purpose auxiliary object class that is intended to hold attributes about human beings. A naturalPerson object class contains fields: naturalPerson = KIND (auxiliary type) NaturalPersonAttributeSet (optional) ID The NaturalPersonAttributeSet may contain any of the following (or future extensions) attributes. emailAddress countryOfCitizenship countryOfResidence pseudonym placeOfBirth serialNumber unstructuredAddress unstructuredName gender dateOfBirth PKCS #9 also defines two matching rules pkcs9CaseIgnoreMatch and signingTimeMatch which are used to determine whether two PKCS #9 attribute values are the same. Attribute types defined in PKCS #9 that are useful in other standards are listed in Table 3 . 
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard
PKCS #10 v1.7 specifies syntax for certificate request. When one entity wants to get a public key certificate, the entity constructs a certificate request and sends it a certification authority, which transforms the request into an X.509 publickey certificate. A certification authority fulfills the request by authenticating the requesting entity and verifying the entity's signature, and, if the request is valid, constructing an X.509 certificate from the distinguished name and public key, the issuer name, and the certification authority's choice of serial number, validity period, and signature algorithm. If the certification request contains any PKCS #9 attributes, the certification authority may also use the values in these attributes as well as other information known to the certification authority to construct X.509 certificate extensions. PKCS #10 does not specify the forms that the certification authority returns the new certificate. A certificate request is constructed with the following steps:
1. Construct a CertificationRequestInfo object containing fields: version, subject, subjectPKInfo, and attributes, where subject contains the entity's distinguished name and subjectPKInfo contains the entity's public key. Some attribute types that might be useful here are defined in PKCS #9. An example is the challengePassword attribute, which specifies a password by which the entity may request certificate revocation. Another example is information to appear in X.509 certificate extensions.
2. Sign the CertificationRequestInfo object with the subject entity's private key.
3. Construct a CertificationRequest object containing fields: CertificationRequestInfo, signatureAlgorithm, and signature, where signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier, and signature contains the entity's signature.
PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard
PKCS #11 v2.20 specifies an application programming interface (API), called "Cryptoki", to devices which hold cryptographic information and perform cryptographic functions. Cryptoki, pronounced "crypto-key" and short for "cryptographic token interface", follows a simple object-based approach, addressing the goals of technology independence (any kind of device) and resource sharing (multiple applications accessing multiple devices), presenting to applications a common, logical view of the device called a "cryptographic token". Cryptoki was intended from the beginning to be an interface between applications and all kinds of portable cryptographic devices, such as those based on smart cards, PCMCIA cards, and smart diskettes. The primary goal of Cryptoki was a lower-level programming interface that abstracts the details of the devices, and presents to the application a common model of the cryptographic device, called a "cryptographic token" (or simply "token"). PKCS #11 v2.20 specifies the data types and functions available to an application requiring cryptographic services using the ANSI C (1990) programming language. These data types and functions will typically be provided via C header files by the supplier of a Cryptoki library. Generic ANSI C header files for Cryptoki are available from the PKCS Web page.
Cryptoki isolates an application from the details of the cryptographic device. The application does not have to change to interface to a different type of device or to run in a different environment; thus, the application is portable.
Cryptoki is intended for cryptographic devices associated with a single user, so some features that might be included in a general-purpose interface are omitted. For example, Cryptoki does not have a means of distinguishing multiple users. The focus is on a single user's keys and perhaps a small number of certificates related to them. Moreover, the emphasis is on cryptography. While the device may perform useful non-cryptographic functions, such functions are left to other interfaces.
Cryptoki is likely to be implemented as a library supporting the functions in the interface, and applications will be linked to the library. An application may be linked to Cryptoki directly; alternatively, Cryptoki can be a so-called shared library (or dynamic link library), in which case the application would link the library dynamically. The dynamic approach certainly has advantages as new libraries are made available, but from a security perspective, there are some drawbacks. In particular, if a library is easily replaced, then there is the possibility that an attacker can substitute a rogue library that intercepts a user's PIN. From a security perspective, therefore, direct linking is generally preferable, although code-signing techniques can prevent many of the security risks of dynamic linking. In any case, whether the linking is direct or dynamic, the programming interface between the application and a Cryptoki library remains the same. Figure 2 describes the general cryptoki model. Cryptoki defines general data types, objects, and functions. The general data types include general information data types (e.g., CK VERSION and CK INFO), slot and token types (e.g., CK SLOT ID), session types (e.g., CK SESSION HANDLE), object types (e.g., CK OBJECT CLASS), data types for mechanisms (e.g., CK MECHANISM INFO), function types (e.g., CK FUNCTION LIST), and locking-related types (e.g., CK CREATEMUTEX).
Cryptoki's logical view of a token is a device that stores objects and can perform cryptographic functions. Cryptoki recognizes three classes of objects, as defined in the CK OBJECT CLASS data type: data, certificates, and keys. An object consists of a set of attributes, each of which has a given value. A key object stores a cryptographic key. The key may be a public key, a private key, or a secret key; each of these types of keys has subtypes for use in specific mechanisms (cryptographic algorithms). For example, public key objects (object class CKO PUBLIC KEY) hold public keys and contains the following common attributes: According to their lifetime, objects are classified as "token objects" and "session objects". Further classification defines access requirements. "PIN" or token-dependent methods are required to access "private token" while no restriction is put on "public tokens".
In addition to the PIN protection to private objects on a token, protection to private keys and secret keys can be given by marking them as sensitive or unextractable. Sensitive keys cannot be revealed in plaintext off the token, and unextractable keys cannot be revealed off the token even when encrypted (though they can still be used as keys). It is expected that access to private, sensitive, or unextractable objects by means other than Cryptoki (e.g., other programming interfaces, or reverse engineering of the device) would be difficult. Cryptoki does not consider the security of the operating system by which the application interfaces to it. For example, since the PIN may be passed through the operating system, a rogue application on the operating system may be able to obtain the PIN.
Cryptoki provides functions for creating, destroying, and copying objects in general, and for obtaining and modifying the values of their attributes. Objects are always well-formed in Cryptoki. That is, an object always contains all required attributes, and the attributes are always consistent with the one from the time the object is created. This contrasts with some object-based paradigms where an object has no attributes other than perhaps a class when it is created, and is uninitialized for some time. In Cryptoki, objects are always initialized.
Cryptoki defines thirteen categories of functions: general-purpose functions (4 functions including C Initialize and C Finalize), slot and token management functions (9 functions), session management functions (8 functions), object management functions (9 functions), encryption functions (4 functions), decryption functions (4 functions), message digesting functions (5 functions), signing and MACing functions (6 functions), functions for verifying signatures and MACs (6 functions), dual-purpose cryptographic functions (4 functions), key management functions (5 functions), random number generation functions (2 functions), and parallel function management functions (2 functions). In addition to these functions, Cryptoki can use application-supplied callback functions to notify an application of certain events, and can also use application-supplied functions to handle mutex objects for safe multi-threaded library access.
Cryptoki has two user types: Security Officer (SO) and normal user. The function of SO is to initiate a token and to set the PIN for the normal user. Only the normal user has access to private objects in the token.
A mechanism specifies precisely how a certain cryptographic process is to be performed (e.g., a digital signature process or a hashing process). Cryptoki defines mechanisms for almost all available cryptographic operations that are currently used in the industry.
An application in a single address space becomes a "Cryptoki application" when one of its running threads calls the cryptoki function C Initialize and it ceases to be the "Cryptoki application" by calling the cryptoki function C Finalize. Cryptoki has support mechanisms for multi-threading access.
Cryptoki requires that an application open one or more sessions with a token to gain access to the token's objects and functions. A session can be a read/write (R/W) session or a read-only (R/O) session. R/W and R/O refer to the access to token objects, not to session objects. In both session types, an application can create, read, write and destroy session objects, and read token objects. Table 4 lists session events. the SO is authenticated to the token. Log In User the normal user is authenticated to the token Log Out the application logs out the current user (SO or normal user) Close Session the application closes the session or closes all sessions Device Removed the device underlying the token has been removed from its slot Cryptoki header files define a large array of data types. Certain packing-and pointer-related aspects of these types are platform-and compiler-dependent; these aspects are therefore resolved on a platform-by-platform (or compiler-bycompiler) basis outside of the Cryptoki header files by means of preprocessor directives. These directives are described in the Cryptoki also. PKCS #12 v1 .0 describes a transfer syntax for personal identity information, including private keys, certificates, miscellaneous secrets, and extensions. Machines, applications, browsers, Internet kiosks, and so on, that support this standard will allow a user to import, export, and exercise a single set of personal identity information. PKCS #12 can be viewed as building on PKCS #8 by including essential but ancillary identity information along with private keys and by instituting higher security through public-key privacy and integrity modes.
PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard
There are four combinations of privacy modes and integrity modes. The privacy modes use encryption (publickey based or password based) to protect personal information from exposure, and the integrity modes (public-key digital signature based or password message authentication code based) protect personal information from tampering. For example, in public-key privacy mode, personal information on the source platform is enveloped using the trusted encryption public key of a known destination platform and the envelop is opened using the corresponding private-key.
Though all combinations of privacy and integrity modes are permitted, certain practices should still be avoided. For example, it is unwise to transport private keys without physical protection when using password privacy mode. In general, it is preferred that the source and destination platforms have trusted public/private key pairs usable for digital signatures and encryption, respectively. When trusted public/private key pairs are not available, password modes for privacy and integrity could be used.
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The top-level exchange PDU (Protocol Data Unit) in PKCS #12 is called PFX. A PFX has three fields: version, authSafe, and macData (optional), where authSafe is a PKCS #7 ContentInfo. Figure 3 It is straightforward to create PFX PDUs from the structure described in Figure 3 . The data wrapped in the PFX could be imported by reversing the procedure for creating a PFX.
PKCS #15: Cryptographic Token Information Syntax Standard
Cryptographic tokens, such as Integrated Circuit Cards (or IC cards) are intrinsically secure computing platforms ideally suited to providing enhanced security and privacy functionality to applications. They can handle authentication information such as digital certificates and capabilities, authorizations and cryptographic keys. Furthermore, they are capable of providing secure storage and computational facilities for sensitive information such as private keys and key fragments. At the same time, many of these tokens provide an isolated processing facility capable of using this information without exposing it within the host environment where it is at potential risk from hostile code (viruses, Trojan horses, and so on). Unfortunately, the use of these tokens for authentication and authorization purposes has been hampered by the lack of interoperability. First, the industry lacks standards for storing a common format of digital credentials (keys, certificates, etc.) on them. This has made it difficult to create applications that can work with credentials from a variety of technology providers. Second, mechanisms to allow multiple applications to effectively share digital credentials have not yet reached maturity. PKCS #15 is a standard intended to enable interoperability among components running on various platforms (platform neutral), to enable applications to take advantage of products and components from multiple manufacturers (vendor neutral), to enable the use of advances in technology without rewriting application-level software (application neutral), and to maintain consistency with existing, related standards while expanding upon them only where necessary and practical. As a practical example, the holder of an IC card containing a digital certificate should be able to present the card to any application running on any host and successfully use the card to present the contained certificate to the application. As a first step to achieve these objectives, PKCS #15 v1.1 specifies a file and directory format for storing security-related information on cryptographic tokens.
The PKCS #15 token information may be read when a token is presented, and is used by a PKCS #15 interpreter which is part of the software environment, e.g., as shown in the PKCS #15 v1.1 defines four general classes of objects: Keys, Certificates, Authentication Objects and Data Objects. All these object classes have sub-classes, e.g. Private Keys, Secret Keys and Public Keys, whose instantiations become objects actually stored on cards. Objects can be private, meaning that they are protected against unauthorized access, or public. In the IC card case, access (read, write, etc) to private objects is defined by Authentication Objects (which also includes Authentication Procedures). Conditional access (from a cardholder's perspective) is achieved with knowledge-based or biometric user information. In other cases, such as when PKCS #15 is implemented in software, private objects may be protected against unauthorized access by cryptographic means. Public objects are not protected from read-access. Whether they are protected against modifications or not depends on the particular implementation.
In general, an IC card file format specifies how certain abstract, higher level elements such as keys and certificates are to be represented in terms of more lower level elements such as IC card files and directory structures. A typical IC card supporting PKCS #15 has the file structure layout as in Figure 5 , where the following abbreviations are used: MF (master file), DF(x) (dedicated file x), and EF(x) (elementary file x).
EF(ODF)
EF ( PKCS #15 defines syntax for application directory contents as in Table 5 . PKCS #15 compliant IC cards should support direct application selection as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 Section 9 and ISO-IEC 7816-5 Section 6 (the full AID is to be used as parameter for a "SELECT FILE" command). The operating system of the card must keep track of the currently selected application and only allow the commands applicable to that particular application while it is selected. The Application Identifier (AID) data element consists 12 bytes and its contents is defined in PKCS #15.
Objects could be created, modified, and removed from the object directory file on a card. ASN.1 syntax for these objects have also been specified in PKCS #15. 
An Example
We conclude this chapter with an example application of different PKCS standards. Assume that we want to implement a smart card authentication system based on public key cryptography technology. Each user will be issued a smart card containing user's private key, public key certificate, and other personal information. Users can authenticate themselves to different computing systems (or banking systems) by inserting their smart cards into card readers attached to these computing systems and typing the password (or PIN). RSA cryptographic primitives specified in PKCS #1 could be chosen as the underlying cryptographic mechanisms. First, user Alice needs to register herself to the system to get her smart card. In the registration process, the system first generates a public-key/private-key pair for Alice. Using PKCS #9, the system may create a naturalPerson object or a few attributes containing Alice's personal information. These information can then be used to generate a CertificateRequest object according to PKCS#10. The system can then send the CertificateRequest object to the Certificate Authorities (CA) enveloped using CMS (PKCS #7). After the identity information verification, the CA signs Alice's public key to generate a certificate for Alice and sends it back to the system. After receiving Alice's certificate from the CA, the system can now build a smart card for Alice. Using Alice's password (PIN), the system generates an EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo object for Alice according to PKCS #8 and PKCS #9 (PKCS #5 is also used in this procedure). PKCS #12 may then be used to transfer Alice's encrypted private key and personal information from one computer to another computer (e.g., from a server machine to the smart card making machine). Using the dedicated file format DF(PKCS#15), Alice's encrypted private key object EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo, certificate, and other personal information could be stored on the smart card. The card is now ready for Alice to use! At the same time, Alice may also get a copy of these private information on a USB memory stick. These personal information is stored on the memory stick according to PKCS #12.
Since all computing systems (e.g., different platforms from different vendors) support PKCS #11 API, when Alice insert her card into an attached card reader, applications on these computing systems can communicate smoothly with Alice's smart card. In particular, after typing password (PIN), Alice's smart card can digitally sign challenges from these computing systems and these computing systems can verify Alice's signature using the certificate presented by Alice's smart card. Thus Alice can authenticate herself to these systems. 
